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DEAD MEN TELL NO TALES: THE 
IMPORTANCE OF THE SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT STANDARD IN THE DEADLY 
FORCE CASE OF GONZALEZ v. CITY OF 
ANAHEIM 
NICHOLAS PISEGNA* 
Abstract: Anaheim police officer Daron Wyatt shot and killed Adolph Gonzalez 
following a traffic stop and physical confrontation among Gonzalez and officers 
Wyatt, and Matthew Ellis. Gonzalez’s successors brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claim alleging, among other claims, a violation of Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from the use of unreasonable and excessive force. In Gonzalez v. 
City of Anaheim, the Ninth Circuit held that inconsistencies in the officers’ testi-
mony regarding the physical confrontation raised a genuine dispute of material 
fact concerning the immediacy of the threat that Gonzalez posed to the officers 
and others. As a result, the court held that summary judgment was not proper. 
This Comment argues that the majority appropriately applied a strict summary 
judgment standard that more broadly considers what constitutes a dispute of ma-
terial fact because the defendants were the cause of the defendant’s death and the 
only surviving eyewitnesses. By allowing such cases to reach the jury, this sum-
mary judgment standard protects the constitutional rights of the deceased and 
prevents courts from improperly relying on one-sided, potentially self-serving 
testimony by state actors. 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 25, 2009, Adolph Anthony Sanchez Gonzalez was shot and 
killed during a dispute with two Anaheim police officers.1 According to the 
testimony of officers Daron Wyatt and Matthew Ellis, Gonzalez failed to com-
ply with the officers’ commands to show his hands and exit his vehicle during 
a traffic stop.2 A physical skirmish ensued, and when Gonzalez “violently ac-
celerated” the car, Officer Wyatt shot and killed him.3 
Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim was the result of claims brought by Gonza-
lez’s father, mother, and daughter seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez III), 747 F.3d 789, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 2 Id. at 792–93. Gonzalez was not accused or suspected of doing anything illegal at the time, and 
the officers did not recognize Gonzalez from any prior contacts. Id. 
 3 Id. 
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violations of the family’s Fourteenth Amendment right of familial association, 
as well as of Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of 
unreasonable and excessive force.4 On July 11, 2011, the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the de-
fendants on both claims, concluding that the officers used reasonable force 
during their encounter with Gonzalez, and that the officers’ conduct was relat-
ed to legitimate law enforcement objectives.5 
On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on both claims.6 Upon 
rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary 
judgment with regard to Gonzalez’s Fourth Amendment claim.7 In the face of 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez II), 715 F.3d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 2013) (2-1 deci-
sion), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2014); Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim 
(Gonzalez I), No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 3 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2011), aff’d, 715 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2014); see also U.S. CONST. 
amends. IV, XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). Section 1983 establishes a right of action against any 
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges rights created by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983; see Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 4–5. To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must 
show that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional or federal statutory right and that the 
defendant acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA 
(SHx), at 4–5. To bring a successful Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force under § 1983, an 
individual must prove that (1) law enforcement officials in some way restrained the liberty of a citi-
zen, resulting in a seizure, and (2) the official’s exercise of force was unreasonable. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Following an incident involving the death 
of an individual at the hands of law enforcement officials, the family of the deceased may also bring a 
claim under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that the law enforcement officials violat-
ed the decedent’s, as well as the family’s, due process rights to be free from unwarranted interference 
with their familial relationship. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 
U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998). To successfully state such a Fourteenth Amendment claim, the family 
members must prove that the actions of the law enforcement officials “shock[] the conscience” and 
were unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Lewis, 523 
U.S. at 846–47. The Supreme Court has defined this “shocks-the-conscience” test as referring to be-
havior that is “conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting Collins 
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)). Elaborating on the standard, the Court charac-
terized behavior that “shocks the conscience” as that which “violates the ‘decencies of civilized con-
duct.’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Rochin v. California 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)) (internal 
quotations omitted); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (analyzing how Court derives 
“shocks the conscience” test from an individual’s Due Process rights); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 
432, 435 (1957) (physician drawing blood for a blood test from a suspect who was unconscious after a 
suspected drunk driving accident not enough to offend due process); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172–73 
(forced pumping of a suspect’s stomach enough to offend due process). 
 5 Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 6–8. 
 6 Gonzalez II, 715 F.3d at 769, 772–73. The panel also affirmed the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment with regard to the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim because the officers’ ac-
tions did not “shock the conscience.” See id. at 772–73. The panel reasoned that the plaintiffs present-
ed “no evidence” that the officers had a “purpose to harm” the decedent for reasons unrelated to legit-
imate law enforcement objectives. Id. 
 7 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 791–92. 
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two strong dissents,8 the en banc majority reasoned that, because the officers 
were the only witnesses able to testify about the events that led to Gonzalez’s 
death, a significant inconsistency in the officers’ testimony pertaining to the 
immediacy of the threat they faced raised a genuine issue of material fact that 
precluded a grant of summary judgment regarding the Fourth Amendment un-
reasonable and excessive force claim.9 
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts of the encounter between the 
officers and Adolph Gonzalez as well as the procedural history of the case. Part 
II discusses the Ninth Circuit’s en banc reversal in part of the district court’s 
and Ninth Circuit panel’s grant of summary judgment. Finally, Part III analyz-
es and agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s holding and application of a strict sum-
mary judgment standard. This Comment argues that in cases involving sum-
mary judgment in which police officers use deadly force and are the only sur-
viving eyewitnesses, courts must consider more broadly what constitutes a 
“genuine issue of material fact.”10 This stricter summary judgment standard 
avoids improper judicial reliance on one-sided, potentially self-serving or in-
accurate testimony by state actors, and protects the constitutional rights of the 
deceased by allowing these cases to survive summary judgment.11 
I. THE FACTS, THE SUCCESSORS’ CLAIM, AND FINDING A  
“GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT” 
On September 25, 2009, at around 2:00 AM, officers Daron Wyatt and 
Matthew Ellis first noticed Gonzalez when a Mazda minivan cut off the offic-
ers as they were responding in their patrol car to an unrelated call.12 After re-
sponding to the unrelated call, the officers returned a few minutes later to the 
location where they had encountered the minivan, noticed the same minivan, 
and saw Gonzalez get into the driver’s side of the vehicle.13 The officers fol-
lowed the car as it drove away and, after observing the minivan weaving with-
in a lane, pulled Gonzalez over.14 The officers did not recognize Gonzalez 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See id. at 798–814 (Trott, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). Judge Trott argued that a combination of many factors, including the seriousness of Gon-
zalez’s crimes, the immediacy of the threat to Officer Ellis in particular, and the fact that Gonzalez 
was actively resisting arrest, clearly supported the conclusion that the officers used reasonable force 
during their encounter with him. See id. at 809 (Trott, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
Judge Kozinski succinctly agreed, concluding that the officers’ actions were objectively reasonable. 
Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 9 See id. at 797 (majority opinion). 
 10 See, e.g., id. at 796–97. 
 11 See id. at 795–97. 
 12 Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez III), 747 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
64 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:E. Supp. 
from any prior contacts, were not aware of any criminal behavior related to the 
minivan, and at no point saw a weapon in the vehicle.15 
A. The Shooting 
After stopping the minivan, both officers exited the patrol car and ap-
proached Gonzalez’s vehicle—Officer Ellis on the driver’s side and Officer 
Wyatt on the passenger’s side.16 Officer Wyatt drew his gun when he thought 
he saw Gonzalez reach for something between the driver’s and passenger’s 
seats, and he warned Gonzalez that he would open fire if Gonzalez reached 
down again.17 Gonzalez complied with Officer Wyatt’s commands and held his 
clenched fists in his lap.18 The officers then opened the driver’s and passen-
ger’s side doors, and Officer Ellis observed Gonzalez pull a plastic bag out of 
another bag located within the car.19 At that point, Officer Ellis told Gonzalez 
to turn off the vehicle and show the officers his hands.20 Gonzalez did not re-
spond to the officer’s command.21 
When Gonzalez failed to comply with Officer Ellis’s commands, Officer 
Wyatt reached into the car, struck Gonzalez’s elbow with his flashlight, and 
repeated the command that Gonzalez open his hands.22 Gonzalez then raised 
his hand up to his mouth, suggesting that he was going to swallow what he had 
in his hand.23 In response, Officer Ellis grabbed Gonzalez and testified that he 
wrestled with Gonzalez in an attempt to gain control of Gonzalez’s hands.24 
Wyatt testified that he could not help Ellis restrain Gonzalez from the driver’s 
side of the vehicle, so he entered the car through the passenger’s side and be-
gan punching Gonzalez in the head.25 
Despite the officers’ efforts, Gonzalez was able to shift the minivan into 
drive during the altercation.26 Officer Ellis testified that Gonzalez “stomp[ed]” 
on the accelerator, while Officer Wyatt claimed that Gonzalez “floored the ac-
celerator” and that the vehicle “violently accelerated.”27 As the vehicle began 
to move, Officer Ellis withdrew from the driver’s side of the vehicle.28 Mean-
                                                                                                                           
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 792–93. 
 27 Id. at 793. 
 28 Id. at 792–93. 
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while, Officer Wyatt, still in the passenger’s seat of the vehicle, yelled at Gon-
zalez to stop the car while trying to turn off the ignition or shift the car into 
neutral or park.29 Officer Wyatt testified that Gonzalez repeatedly swatted Of-
ficer Wyatt’s hands away from the ignition and the gearshift, and refused to 
comply with Wyatt’s commands.30 At this point, Officer Wyatt drew his weap-
on and shot Gonzalez in the head from a distance of less than six inches, kill-
ing Gonzalez.31 Following the shooting, the minivan struck a parked car and 
stopped.32 Wyatt testified that he shot Gonzalez less than ten seconds after the 
car started moving, but noted that it could have been less than five seconds.33 
He testified that the car traveled approximately fifty feet in that time period; he 
also testified that the car was going fifty miles per hour at the time of the 
shot.34 
B. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit Confront the  
Successors’ Claims 
Gonzalez’s successors brought 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the offic-
ers and the City of Anaheim, alleging that the officers used excessive force in 
their encounter with Gonzalez in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that 
the officers’ actions denied the family a familial relationship with Gonzalez in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.35 The family argued that under the 
Fourth Amendment, the physical force that the two officers used during their 
encounter, including but not limited to when Officer Wyatt fatally shot the de-
cedent in the head, was objectively unreasonable and excessive.36 In particular, 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. at 793. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. This discrepancy would become the focus of the appeal. See, e.g., id. at 795–97; Gonzalez 
v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez II), 715 F.3d 766, 771–72 (9th Cir. 2013) (2-1 decision), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit en banc majority held that this 
issue of fact—whether the van was going fifty miles per hour at the time of the shot, or whether it had 
traveled fifty feet in five seconds, putting the speed closer to seven miles per hour—was material and 
in genuine dispute, and therefore it must go to a jury to decide. Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 796–97. 
 35 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 793. 
 36 Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez I), No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 5 (C.D. Cal. July 11, 
2011), aff’d, 715 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 
2014); see supra note 4 (discussing the standard for a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983). The family also argued that the officers acted unreasonably when Officer Wyatt 
used his flashlight to hit the decedent on the arm, when Officer Ellis placed the decedent in a carotid 
restraint, when Officer Wyatt punched the decedent on the head and face while he was being re-
strained by Officer Ellis, and when Officer Ellis used his flashlight to hit the decedent on the back of 
the head while he was restraining the decedent. Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 5. The 
Ninth Circuit implicitly affirmed the district court’s finding that these exercises of force were reason-
able. See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 797; Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 5–7. 
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the plaintiffs argued that the officers’ use of deadly force was unreasonable and 
excessive because the decedent was not combative, assaultive, or threatening 
to either officer, did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 
or others, and because he only fled as an act of self-defense against the offic-
ers’ violent acts.37 With regard to the excessive force claim, the court ruled that 
the officers’ conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the force 
that the officers used during the encounter was objectively reasonable.38 Gon-
zalez’s mother and daughter appealed.39 
A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, agreeing with the lower court that all of the force the officers used 
during their encounter with Gonzalez was objectively reasonable.40 After or-
dering that the case be reheard en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to the successors’ Fourth 
Amendment claim alleging the use of unreasonable deadly force, and affirmed 
the grant of summary judgment with regard to the successors’ Fourteenth 
Amendment familial relationship claim.41 
II. THE MAJORITY’S RECOGNITION OF THE POWER OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN THE FACE OF DEADLY FORCE 
On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit en banc majority concluded that the case 
presented a genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Gonzalez 
posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and therefore 
summary judgment concerning the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim was 
inappropriate.42 The majority reasoned that because the officers were facing an 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 24–26, Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez II), 715 F.3d 
766 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-56360), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2014) 
[hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief]; Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx) at 5, 7. The family 
also alleged that the officers acted with a purpose to harm the decedent unrelated to legitimate law en-
forcement objectives, and therefore “shocks the conscience” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 8 (citing Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th 
Cir. 2008); Appellant’s Opening Brief at 30–32. 
 38 Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 5, 7. The court also concluded that the officers’ 
conduct did not “shock the conscience,” and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, a 
ruling that the Ninth Circuit affirmed. See Gonzalez I, No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 8; see also Gon-
zalez III, 747 F.3d at 797–98. 
 39 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 793. 
 40 Gonzalez II, 715 F.3d at 773. The panel also affirmed the district court’s ruling that the officers’ 
conduct did not violate the Gonzalez successors’ Fourteenth Amendment right of familial association, as 
the plaintiffs presented no evidence that the officers had a “purpose to harm” Gonzalez for reasons 
unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives, and therefore the officers’ behavior did not 
“shock[] the conscience.” Id. at 772–73 (quoting Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137). 
 41 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 791–92. 
 42 Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez III), 747 F.3d 789, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
The majority also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment with regard to the Gonzalez 
successors’ familial relationship claim because a reasonable jury could not find that the officers’ use of 
2015] Summary Judgment in Deadly Force Cases: Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim 67  
excessive force claim and were the only witnesses able to testify regarding the 
events that led to Gonzalez’s death, “summary judgment should be granted 
sparingly . . . .”43 Taking that strict summary judgment standard into considera-
tion, the majority concluded that a significant inconsistency in the officers’ 
testimony regarding the circumstances that led to Officer Wyatt’s use of deadly 
force raised a genuine issue of material fact that precluded a grant of summary 
judgment.44 
The majority concluded that the record raised a genuine dispute of mate-
rial fact because a reasonable jury could find that Gonzalez did not pose a suf-
ficiently immediate threat to the officers or others to justify the use of deadly 
force.45 The Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on the Supreme Court’s standard 
for determining whether a law enforcement official’s use of force is objectively 
reasonable, which hinges on the immediacy of the threat facing the law en-
forcement officials.46 In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court concluded that 
to assess whether a police officer’s use of force is unreasonable or excessive 
under the Fourth Amendment, courts should weigh the gravity of the type and 
amount of force inflicted against the government interest at stake by evaluat-
ing: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed an 
                                                                                                                           
force “shock[ed] the conscience.” Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 797–98 (quoting Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 
1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 43 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795. The court reasoned that because the officer defendants were the 
only surviving eyewitnesses, the court should only sparingly grant summary judgment in order to “‘en-
sure that the officer[s are] not taking advantage of the fact that the witness most likely to contradict [their] 
story—the person shot dead—is unable to testify.’” Id. (quoting Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th 
Cir. 1994)). The majority based its reasoning and conclusion on the summary judgment standard: wheth-
er, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are any genuine dis-
putes of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 793; 
see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The Supreme Court has interpreted this standard to mean that there is a genu-
ine dispute of material fact if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (concluding that only 
issues of “material fact” can defeat a motion for summary judgment); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (concluding that material facts are those that might affect the out-
come of the suit, and defining a “genuine” dispute of material fact to mean that the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party). Questions of fact are to be left to 
the jury. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795. 
 44 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 797; see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). Specifically, 
the court pointed to Officer Wyatt’s inconsistent testimony that the car traveled fifty feet in five to ten 
seconds, but also that the car was going fifty miles per hour at the time he shot Gonzalez. Gonzalez 
III, 747 F.3d at 793. In a critical footnote, the majority noted that although the question of whether a law 
enforcement officer’s actions were objectively reasonable is a question of law, the question in this case 
concerns a dispute regarding the facts that inform the analysis of whether the officers’ use of force was 
reasonable. Id. at 794 n.1. 
 45 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 797; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 
at 247–48 (holding that when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, a 
genuine dispute of material fact exists). 
 46 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 793–94; Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 
433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect is the most 
important factor in the Graham analysis). 
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immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the 
suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.47 
Courts consider the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect to be the 
most important factor.48 
Based on the facts in the record as well as the officers’ testimony, the ma-
jority concluded that, in contrast to testimony that the van was traveling fifty 
miles per hour at the time of the shot, a reasonable jury could believe Officer 
Wyatt’s testimony that the minivan traveled about fifty feet in less than five or 
ten seconds before Wyatt fired the shot that killed Gonzalez.49 Under those 
facts, the van would have been traveling at around three to seven miles per 
hour at the time of the shot, and the court concluded that a reasonable jury 
could decide that a van traveling with such minor acceleration and speed 
would not have posed enough of an immediate threat to the officers or others 
to justify the use of deadly force.50 
The dissenting opinions emphatically disagreed with the majority’s rever-
sal of summary judgment, and agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s earlier panel 
decision that because “all three Graham factors support the officers,” Officer 
Wyatt’s use of deadly force was objectively reasonable.51 Based on the “threat 
of acceleration” of the van alone, both dissents concluded that the officers 
faced a significant, immediate threat to themselves and to the public that justi-
                                                                                                                           
 47 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 48 See id.; Mattos, 661 F.3d at 441. 
 49 Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 793, 795. 
 50 Id. at 794, 796. A car traveling fifty feet in ten seconds would travel an average speed of 3.4 
miles per hour; a car traveling fifty feet in five seconds would travel an average speed of 6.8 miles per 
hour. Id. at 794. The defendants, on the other hand, argued that “[t]he undisputed evidence is that the 
decedent was speeding down the street going approximately 40 to 50 MPH with Officer Wyatt 
trapped inside the van.” See id. at 796. The defendants maintained this position despite Officer Wy-
att’s unclear testimony regarding the speed of the van. See id. at 794–96. 
 51 Gonzalez II, 715 F.3d 766, 771 (9th Cir. 2013) (2-1 decision), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en 
banc, 747 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2014); see Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 809–10 (Trott, J., dissenting in part 
and concurring in part); Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also Graham, 490 
U.S. at 396. Judge Trott dissented at length, while Judge Kozinski’s dissent added a paragraph that 
was concerned with the policy ramifications of the majority’s holding, worrying that the majority’s 
decision will “give plaintiffs a bludgeon with which to extort a hefty settlement.” Gonzalez III, 747 
F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see id. at 798–814 (Trott, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part). In his dissent, Judge Trott reasoned that the Graham test supported Officer Wyatt’s use of deadly 
force because the officers were confronted with (1) multiple serious crimes; (2) an “uncooperative, suspi-
cious, and menacing” suspect who, when he “stomped” down on the gas pedal of the van, posed an im-
mediate threat to the officers and the public; and (3) an “uncooperative” suspect who was clearly resisting 
arrest and attempting to flee. Id. at 807 (Trott, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (internal 
quotations omitted). Further, Judge Trott argued that the majority discounted precedent that implored 
courts to consider a police officer’s actions from the perspective of an officer in the field who is forced to 
make a split-second decision in the face of danger. See id. at 813. 
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fied the use of deadly force, particularly given that the officers had only sec-
onds to react.52 
III. THE DELICATE BALANCE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT  
AND DEADLY FORCE 
In summary judgment cases like Gonzalez’s in which police officers use 
deadly force and are the only surviving eyewitnesses, courts should more 
broadly consider what constitutes a “genuine dispute of material fact”—that is, 
they should more broadly characterize the types of questions of fact that might 
affect the outcome of the suit and, accordingly, should be left to the jury.53 A 
broader view of the facts in the record in excessive force cases will help to pre-
serve the constitutional rights of the deceased and to prevent the courts from 
endorsing one-sided and potentially self-serving or inaccurate accounts from 
the eyewitness police officers.54 
Given the use of deadly force in this case and the fact that Officers Wyatt 
and Ellis were the only surviving eyewitnesses of their encounter with the de-
cedent, the majority appropriately applied a strict summary judgment standard 
in reversing the district court’s and Ninth Circuit panel’s grant of summary 
judgment.55 The majority rightly pinpointed a critical detail in analyzing this 
excessive force case: the decedent, the individual most likely to contradict the 
story of the officers, was unable to testify because of the actions of the offic-
                                                                                                                           
 52 See id. at 809–10. In support of the second Graham factor, Judge Trott pointed out that the 
plaintiffs do not dispute that Gonzalez “stomped down on the accelerator” of the van. See id. at 811 
(internal quotations omitted). Because Gonzalez indisputably “stomped down on the gas pedal,” he 
posed a significant threat to the officers, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
decedent because of the “threat of acceleration” of the car. See id. at 809–11. The dissent concluded 
that the actual speed of the vehicle is not “material” because it has no effect on the outcome of the 
suit; the threat of acceleration was enough to conclude that Officer Wyatt’s use of deadly force was 
reasonable under the Graham analysis. See id.; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 53 See Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez III), 747 F.3d 789, 797 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); 
see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The Ninth Circuit has 
repeatedly analyzed deadly force cases using this strict summary judgment standard that more broadly 
defines both what constitutes a material fact, as well as what constitutes a genuine dispute of material 
fact. See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 797; Glenn v. Washington Cnty., 673 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 
2011); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005); Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 
(9th Cir. 2002). 
 54 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794–95; Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994); see 
also U.S. CONST. amends. IV, VII, XIV. 
 55 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794–95, 797; see also Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez 
II), 715 F.3d 766, 773 (9th Cir. 2013) (2-1 decision), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 789 
(9th Cir. 2014); Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim (Gonzalez I), No. CV 10-4660 PA (SHx), at 7 (C.D. 
Cal. July 11, 2011), aff’d, 715 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 747 F.3d 
789 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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ers.56 Considering this context, the majority appropriately scoured the record 
for any inconsistencies that could raise issues of fact or witness credibility—
issues that the decedent may have raised if given the opportunity—in order to 
view the facts in the light most favorable to Gonzalez.57 The court’s holding 
that the inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony raised a genuine question 
regarding a material fact indicates that the majority understood the importance 
of applying a stricter summary judgment standard in these cases, and of leav-
ing questions regarding critical facts and the credibility of the lone eyewitness-
es to the jury. 58 
The court’s strict summary judgment analysis is appropriate in part be-
cause of how the Ninth Circuit has applied the Supreme Court’s Graham v. 
Connor analysis that governs excessive force cases.59 The Ninth Circuit has 
repeatedly held that summary judgment in excessive force cases should be 
granted sparingly, and the court echoed that concern in its strict summary 
judgment analysis of Gonzalez’s case.60 Noting the precedent in the Ninth Cir-
cuit that applied Graham, the majority emphasized the perspective and rights 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795; Scott, 39 F.3d at 915. Neither dissent raised the issue of the 
officers being the only surviving witnesses. See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 798–814 (Trott, J., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part); id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 57 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794, 797; Scott, 39 F.3d at 915. The Ninth Circuit has stressed that 
courts in this kind of case should heavily scrutinize the record—including medical reports, contempora-
neous statements by the officers, available physical evidence, and circumstantial evidence—for incon-
sistencies, as such inconsistencies can evidence disputes of fact that preclude a grant of summary judg-
ment. See Scott, 39 F.3d at 915. 
 58 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795–97. Both questions of fact as well as questions of witness 
credibility fall within the “exclusive province of the [jury] . . . .” Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 59 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795–97; 
Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871; Miller v. Clark Cnty., 340 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 60 See, e.g., Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794–97; Glenn, 673 F.3d 864 (reversing grant of summary 
judgment in deadly force case because, generously viewing facts in light most favorable to the victim, 
facts concerning immediacy of threat posed by the suspect suggested that decedent was likely trying 
to harm himself and not the officers or others, and therefore raised a genuine dispute of material fact 
under Graham); Smith, 394 F.3d 689 (reversing grant of summary judgment in excessive force case 
involving police’s response to domestic violence complaint, where victim of police use of force, the 
alleged male perpetrator, refused to comply with police commands, because, generously viewing facts 
in light most favorable to the victim, testimony of officers and victim raised genuine disputes of fact 
with regard to each of the three Graham factors); Santos, 287 F.3d 846 (reversing grant of summary 
judgment in excessive force case where, generously viewing facts in light most favorable to the vic-
tim, the facts—officers brought to the ground victim who appeared to be intoxicated in public and did 
not pose an immediate risk to the officers or others, breaking the victim’s back—created genuine 
disputes of material facts under Graham). The Seventh Circuit has similarly analyzed cases involving 
police officers’ use of deadly force when the police officers are the only surviving witnesses. See, e.g., 
Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing grant of summary judg-
ment in deadly force case where, generously viewing facts in light most favorable to the victim, medi-
cal expert testimony conflicted regarding cause of victim’s lethal injuries—allegedly caused by an 
officer kneeling on the victim’s shoulder during an arrest—and therefore raised genuine dispute of 
material fact under Graham). 
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of the deceased as an important part of weighing the Graham factors against 
the gravity of the officers’ intrusion on the victim’s Fourth Amendment inter-
ests.61 This emphasis is appropriate given the Supreme Court’s reasoning that 
the intrusiveness of an officer’s actions that involve the use of deadly force is 
“unmatched.”62 Therefore, in order to counterbalance such an intrusion on an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests to sufficiently justify a grant of sum-
mary judgment, a defendant must prove that the officer’s actions are over-
whelmingly reasonable under the Graham analysis.63 
The majority’s strict summary judgment standard is also appropriate be-
cause the inquiry under Graham is highly fact sensitive.64 The majority notes 
that the Graham inquiry is so fact sensitive because the “immediate threat” 
that the suspect poses to the officers or others—the most important factor in 
determining whether the officers’ actions were reasonable—can develop and 
unravel in mere seconds.65 As a result, in cases where the officers are the only 
surviving eyewitnesses, many of the critical facts that inform the Graham 
analysis are only available from the perspective of the party moving for sum-
mary judgment.66 
In situations where many of the critical facts come from the one-sided and 
potentially self-serving or inaccurate testimony of the officers, the court can 
only fairly gauge the reasonableness of the officers’ actions under the fact-
sensitive Graham test by more broadly considering what constitutes a material 
fact and a genuine dispute of material fact.67 In such cases, the individual most 
likely to contradict the testimony of the officers—the victim—is unable to pre-
sent his or her side of the story to protect his or her Fourth Amendment inter-
ests and also to inform the court’s analysis of the officer’s use of force.68 The 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794–95 (citing Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871; Scott, 39 F.3d at 914–15). 
 62 Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985); see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d 
at 795. 
 63 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 796–97; accord Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see, e.g., Scott, 39 F.3d 
at 915 (holding summary judgment appropriate where facts, testimony, and circumstantial evidence 
showed no genuine dispute of fact, and where officers who applied deadly force “clearly” satisfied the 
Graham test, as suspect raised gun at officers when officers opened door and identified themselves as 
police officers). 
 64 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 796–97; accord Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 65 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 792–95. Because the facts that inform the “immediacy of the 
threat” factor of the Graham analysis can result from circumstances that happen quickly as well as 
that are unique to the case before the court, the majority, as well as other decisions that apply Graham, 
implied that the analysis is highly fact sensitive. See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 792–93, 796 (reasoning 
that in excessive force case where encounter that lasted mere seconds, the court should “emphasize[] 
the importance of considering all the facts”); Glenn, 673 F.3d at 869, 871 (reasoning that in excessive 
force case where encounter lasted less than four minutes, the court should emphasize the importance 
of considering all of the facts). 
 66 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795; accord Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 67 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795–97; accord Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 68 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795; Scott, 39 F.3d at 915; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
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stricter summary judgment standard allows the court to protect the constitu-
tional rights of the decedent, the individual most likely to contradict the testi-
mony of the officers, and avoids relying on potentially self-serving or inaccu-
rate testimony.69 Therefore, the stricter standard, which the majority properly 
applied in this case, preserves the court’s role as a neutral magistrate in cases 
involving a clash between executive power and constitutional rights.70 
CONCLUSION 
By applying a strict summary judgment standard to Adolph Gonzalez’s 
Fourth Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit protected the constitutional rights 
of an individual who was killed by a questionable use of police force, and pre-
vented the court from endorsing a one-sided, self-serving view of the circum-
stances that led to Gonzalez’s death. Without a stricter summary judgment 
standard in such cases, courts will rely only on facts that exclusively come 
from the party moving for summary judgment. Courts cannot blindly endorse 
such an “unmatched” intrusion into the constitutional rights of a citizen by law 
enforcement officials. 
Instead, the majority admirably stands up for the decedent—a victim of 
controversial police violence and an individual deserving proper legal consid-
eration—by reversing the grant of summary judgment and propelling the case 
towards trial. Had he not died as a result of the police action, Gonzalez could 
have exercised his constitutional right to offer facts that contradicted the offic-
ers’ account of the events. By broadly defining what constitutes a material fact 
and what constitutes a genuine issue of material fact in these cases, the majori-
ty protected the constitutional rights of the decedent. In addition, by using such 
a broad summary judgment standard, the court preserved the role of the jury to 
decide questions of material fact and witness credibility and avoided potential-
ly endorsing a police officer’s unreasonable use of excessive force. 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794, 797. The preservation of such questions of fact and witness 
credibility also bolsters the appropriate balance between the court and the jury, as it is “the exclusive 
province of the [jury] to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts, and draw 
reasonable inferences from proven facts.” Long, 736 F.3d at 896; Santos, 287 F.3d at 853; see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. VII; Mayhew v. Thatcher, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 129, 129 (1821) (concluding that ques-
tions of fact in civil cases are to be tried by the jury if either party demands a jury). 
 70 See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 795–97; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542–543 
(2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stressing that judicial branch, as neutral 
branch of government, must protect against abuse of executive power); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stressing that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
partment” to interpret the Constitution and “say what the law is”). In addition, by considering the ap-
propriate allocation of power between the judge and jury, the court reinforces the neutral, fair judicial 
check on executive power in which the judge is to determine issues of law and the jury is to determine 
issues of fact and witness credibility. See Gonzalez III, 747 F.3d at 794 n.1; Long, 736 F.3d at 896. 
